Securing SQLJ Source Codes from Business Logic Disclosure by Data Hiding
  Obfuscation by Sivadasan, Praveen & Lal, P. Sojan
Securing SQLJ Source Codes from Business Logic 
Disclosure by Data Hiding Obfuscation  
Praveen Sivadasan 
PhD Scholar 
School of Computer Sciences, MG University 
Kottayam, Kerala, India 
praveen_sivadas@yahoo.com 
Dr.P.Sojan Lal 
Research Guide 
School of Computer Sciences, MG University  
Kottayam, Kerala, India 
sojanlal@gmail.com
 
 
Abstract— Information security is protecting information from 
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, 
perusal and destruction. CAIN model suggest maintaining the 
Confidentiality, Authenticity, Integrity and Non-repudiation 
(CAIN) of information.  Oracle 8i, 9i and 11g Databases support 
SQLJ framework allowing embedding of SQL statements in Java 
Programs and providing programmer friendly means to access 
the Oracle database. As cloud computing technology is becoming 
popular, SQLJ is considered as a flexible and user friendly 
language for developing distributed applications in grid 
architectures. SQLJ source codes are translated to java byte 
codes and decompilation is generation of source codes from 
intermediate byte codes.  The intermediate SQLJ application 
byte codes are open to decompilation, allowing a malicious reader 
to forcefully decompile it for understanding confidential business 
logic or data from the codes. To the best of our knowledge, strong 
and cost effective techniques exist for Oracle Database security, 
but still data security techniques are lacking for client side 
applications, giving possibility for revelation of confidential 
business data.   Data obfuscation is hiding the data in codes and 
we suggest enhancing the data security in SQLJ source codes by 
data hiding, to mitigate disclosure of confidential business data, 
especially integers in distributed applications. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
A stored procedure[10] is a program or routine that is invoked 
from a client program, and executes under the control of 
database manager[2,3]. The database programming tool 
SQLJ[1,11,12,13] which stands for "SQL-Java”, allows  SQL 
statements directly embedded within Java applications. DB2 
and SQLJ support client side Java Stored Procedures[8], 
where the Stored Procedure Specification allows 
implementing database stored procedures and functions in 
Java. JDBC is a component that do not allow embedding of 
SQL statements[4], but allow SQL statements to be passed to 
the database and to be executed at the server side, for the 
performance of Client Server based Database applications. 
SQLJ and JDBC are defined in Java Source codes. The SQL 
statements are embedded in the Java program using the syntax 
#sql {<sql-statement>} and the SQLJ programs are with an 
extension of .sqlj.  
 
SQLJ allows multiple connections to allow data access from 
several databases. It also allows to use Dynamic SQL.Also, 
PL/SQL stored procedures can be called from SQLJ, like #sql 
{CALL latestTransactionDate(:in m, :out lastDate)};. The 
syntax of SQLJ is compact than that of JDBC helping to write 
shorter programs with greater user productivity. It is Database 
neutral and works with Oracle, Sybase and DB2. The 
following shows samples of SQLJ and JDBC codes. 
 
//  SQLJ 
int n; 
#sql { INSERT INTO emp VALUES (:n)}; 
 
//  JDBC 
int n; 
Statement stmt = conn.prepareStatement  
                (“INSERT INTO emp VALUES (?)”); 
stmt.setInt(1,n); 
stmt.execute (); 
stmt.close(); 
 
During execution, the SQLJ applications are undergone 
through a Translation, Compilation and Customization 
process, in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure1 SQLJ Execution steps 
 
 
During Translation,in Figure2, the SQLJ program with an 
extension .sqlj is translated into a .java source file by the SQLJ 
Translator which automatically invokes the Java compiler to 
produce a .class file. The Java compiler generates byte codes 
for SQLJ and JDBC for the JVM. The Sematics-Checker or 
Checker performs the translation time syntax and semantics 
checking of the SQL statements. The translation, in Figure3, 
would result in output files with extension .java, followed by 
compilation create files with extensions. class and .ser. The 
.class and .ser files are archived into a .jar file.  
 
The .java files are calls to the SQLJ runtime, which in turn 
calls the JDBC driver during application execution. The 
SQLJCodes Translation Compilation Customization 
serialized resource files with extension .ser contain the 
application profiles which are information about all the SQL 
instructions. In customization, the profile created during the 
translator's code generation phase is customized for use with 
particular database and performance enhancements specific to 
Oracle databases. 
 
 
Figure 2 SQLJ Translator Framework 
 
Oracle JDeveloper10g is a Java-based Integrated Development 
Environment(IDE) for SQLJ programming. 
 
 
Figure 3 Output files after translation and compilation 
 
II. SOFTWARE OBFUSCATION 
 
Software obfuscation or code obfuscation [5,6] transforms a 
program into an obfuscated program which is difficult to 
comprehend.  The various popular obfuscation transformation 
techniques are Lexical Transformation, Data Transformation 
and Control Transformation. Layout transformation makes the 
structure of the transformed program difficult to comprehend, 
by replacing the mnemonics of original structure with 
unreadable formats. Data transformation obscures the crucial 
data and data structures of the original program, whereas 
control transformation obscures its flow of execution. Data 
Hiding is a data transformation technique that hides the data of 
the original program. The effectiveness of obfuscation is 
usually measured in terms of a) the potency that is the degree 
to which the reader is confused[9] b) the resilience that is the 
degree to which the obfuscation attacks are resisted and finally 
c) the cost which measures the amount of execution 
time/space penalty suffered by the program due to 
obfuscation. 
 
The source code and byte code can be obfuscated and despite 
the fact that implementation of source code obfuscators is little 
hard, the obfuscator can apply transformations to codes at any 
stage of development. It also adds significant strength to byte 
codes and thereby making the business data also hidden in the 
decompiled version. 
 
Encrypting of code makes it mandatory to decrypt it prior to 
execution, which leads to interception and stealing of codes by 
special hardwares. But obfuscation helps the code to execute 
without transforming to its original format making it better 
than cryptographic approaches to add more strength to 
software codes. Deobfuscators are tools that generate original 
codes from obfuscated versions. Reverse engineering effort is 
the effort for the malicious reader in understanding obfuscated 
codes. 
 
III. DISCLOSURE OF INTEGER DATA IN  SQLJ 
CODES VIOLATING CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Various customized or internet banking applications are 
developed in Java allowing EBusiness operations to be carried 
out efficiently between banks and other enterprises. SQLJ is a 
popular tool that allows SQL and PL/SQL stored procedures 
to be embedded in Java and provides high flexibility for Java 
based database applications development.  
 
The PL/SQL stored procedures and the database contents at 
the server side are well protected by encryption and strong 
security techniques[14]. But, the SQLJ procedures at the client 
side could surely expose business operation details to a 
malicious reader. 
 
We realized that the SQLJ procedures can be strengthened and              
protected from revelation of business logic by obfuscation 
than encryption, allowing maximum Java Stored Procedures 
definitions and its utilization. We propose strengthening of 
SQLJ embedded stored procedures by data hiding, especially 
by hiding the crucial and confidential integer business data in 
procedures.  
 
In the following paragraphs, we present some sample SQLJ 
codes that expose integer business data. 
 
Case1:// SOURCE FILE NAME: TbSel.sqlj, Copyright IBM 
Corp. 2007 
        /* The following if statement sets the new employee's 
benefits based  on their years of experience. 
        */ if(years > 14) 
   benefits = "Advanced Health Coverage and 
Pension Plan"; 
 else if(years > 9) 
   benefits = "Advanced Health Coverage"; 
 else if(years > 4) 
   benefits = "Basic Health Coverage"; 
 else 
          benefits = "No Benefits"; 
 
 
Case2: // SOURCE FILE NAME: SpClient.sqlj 
      // set the input parameters of the stored procedure           
      inParamLowSal = 15000; 
      inParamMedSal = 20000; 
      inParamHighSal = 25000; 
      System.out.println("Call stored procedure named " + 
procName); 
      #sql {CALL IN_PARAMS(:in inParamLowSal, :in 
inParamMedSal,  
                           :in inParamHighSal, :in inDept)}; 
 
      System.out.println(procName + " completed 
successfully"); 
 
      // display total salary after calling IN_PARAMS 
      #sql {SELECT SUM(salary) INTO :sumSalary 
              FROM employee 
              WHERE workdept = :inDept}; 
 
 
Case3: // SOURCE FILE NAME: TbCreate.sqlj  
// create a table called emp_details with a 'CHECK' constraint 
      System.out.println( 
        "\n  CREATE TABLE emp_details(empno INTEGER 
NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,\n" + 
        "                   name VARCHAR(10),\n" + 
        "                   firstname VARCHAR(20),\n" + 
        "                   salary INTEGER CONSTRAINT 
minsalary\n" + 
        "                          CHECK (salary >= 25000)\n" + 
        "                          NOT ENFORCED\n" + 
        "                          ENABLE QUERY 
OPTIMIZATION)\n"); 
      #sql {CREATE TABLE emp_details(empno INTEGER 
NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, 
                             name VARCHAR(10), 
                             firstname VARCHAR(20), 
                             salary INTEGER CONSTRAINT minsalary 
                                    CHECK (salary >= 25000) 
                                    NOT ENFORCED 
                                    ENABLE QUERY OPTIMIZATION)}; 
"  Invoke the statement:\n" + 
        "    INSERT INTO staff(id, name, dept, salary)\n" + 
        "      SELECT INTEGER(empno)+100, lastname, 77, 
salary\n" + 
        "        FROM employee\n" + 
        "        WHERE INTEGER(empno) >= 310"); 
 
      #sql {INSERT INTO staff(id, name, dept, salary) 
              SELECT INTEGER(empno) + 100, lastname, 77, 
salary 
                FROM employee 
                WHERE INTEGER(empno) >= 310}; 
 
#sql {UPDATE staff 
              SET salary = salary + 1000 
              WHERE id >= 310 AND dept = 84}; 
 
Case4: // SOURCE FILE NAME: TbCursor.sqlj 
      // display the final content of the 'staff' table 
      staffTbContentDisplay(); 
 
      System.out.println(); 
      System.out.println( 
        "  Invoke the statements:\n" + 
        "    DECLARE posCur CURSOR FOR\n" + 
        "      SELECT name, dept FROM staff WHERE id >= 
310\n" + 
        "\n" + 
        "    FETCH :posCur INTO :name, :dept\n" + 
        "    while (successful fetch)\n" + 
        "    {\n" + 
        "      if (dept != 84)\n" + 
        "      {\n" + 
        "        UPDATE staff\n" + 
        "          SET comm = 0.01 * (SELECT AVG(salary)\n"+ 
        "                               FROM staff\n" + 
        "                               WHERE id >= 310)\n" + 
        "          WHERE CURRENT OF :posCur\n" + 
        "      }\n" + 
        "      FETCH :posCur INTO :name, :dept\n" + 
        "    }"); 
      // declare a cursor 
      #sql posCur = {SELECT name, dept FROM staff WHERE 
id >= 310}; 
 
The above discussed codes contain integers that could expose 
the business logic to a malicious reader and we suggest hiding 
the data, to maintain the data confidentiality in the source 
code. 
 
IV. PROPOSAL TO HIDE INTEGERS IN SQLJ CODES 
 
Our Data hiding transformation considered and discussed in 
[7], hides integer value 2 by an F(a,b) call. Any integer say 
‘m’ is represented as (m/2)*F(c,d),if m is even and 
(m/2)*F(c,d)+1,if m is odd. Each successive iteration further 
tries to hide the parameter ‘c’ of the F() calls, making it nested 
like  F(F(F(F()))), making the reader hard to find the hidden 
value. A sample java code is shown below to explain the data 
obfuscation process. 
 
 
 
 
The file Query.java is as follows. 
 
class Query 
{ public static String query; 
public static String Obfus( ) 
{query="UPDATE Account_Holders  
SET Acct_Balance=Acct_Balance+"+ 
Integer.toString(50)+ 
" WHERE  Acct_Balance>"+Integer.toString(5000); 
  return(query);}} 
 
The following is an integer hidden obfuscated code. 
   
class Query_mod123123123123 extends obfuscate 
{  
public static String query; 
public static String Obfus( ) 
{query="UPDATE Account_Holders SET 
Acct_Balance=Acct_Balance+"+Integer.toString((25*F(F(F(F
(1524%767,7)*187%191,5)*762%767,7)*187%191,5)))+ 
WHEREAcct_Balance>"+Integer.toString((2500*F(F((F((F(4
9135%24575,12)*378+F(33%21,2))%383,6)*24567+F(33%2
1,2))%24575,12)*3065%3071,9))); 
return(query);}} 
 
CONCLUSION 
The data hiding adds significant reverse engineering effort and 
potency to the codes, without costing much on its execution 
time. It is convinced that data hiding obfuscation maintains the 
confidentiality of application data, conforming to the CAIN 
model. We are in the initial implementation phase of SQLJ 
obfuscator and it has been named as “JSQLJ Obfuscator”. 
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